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BECOMING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE 
Bartholomew H. Sparrow 
ADAM BURNS, AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1783-2013 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017). PP. 216. 
HARDCOVER $105.00. 
 
PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND 
POLITICAL EXPANSION (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017). PP. 312. 
HARDCOVER $35.00. 
Over most of the twentieth century and throughout the Cold War, scholars and 
commentators rarely identified the United States as an “empire.” Rather, it was the “leader 
of the free world” and stood as a “beacon of democracy” in its opposition to the strategic 
ambitions, politics, economics, and ideologies of Nazi Germany, fascism, the Soviet 
Union, the People’s Republic of China, and international communism. Yet, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the onset of the so-called War on Terror in late 
2001, the United States is once again being described as an “empire.” 
The notion of the United States as an empire has a long history. George Washington 
wrote of “our Empire,” one where Americans were “the sole Lords and Proprietors of a 
vast tract of Continent, comprehending all the various soils and climates of the World, and 
abounding with all the necessaries and conveniences of life, are now, by the late 
satisfactory pacification, acknowledged to be possessed of absolute Freedom and 
Independency.”1 Thomas Jefferson repeatedly referred to the United States as an “empire 
of liberty.” And Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall identified the Union as an 
“American Empire” in Loughborough v. Blake.2 Americans also commonly identified the 
United States as an “empire” in the periods leading up to and following the 1898 Spanish-
American War, no matter their political views of U.S. overseas expansion. In fact, 
policymakers and public intellectuals throughout American history, from the founding 
through the early twentieth century, broadly agreed that United States should expand 
geographically, admit more states, resist foreign powers, and become richer. 
This long record of geographical and political aggrandizement, the Civil War era 
                                                          
 1. George Washington to John Hancock (Circular), 11 June 1783, WASH. PAPERS, http://gwpapers.virginia. 
edu/documents/george-washington-to-john-hancock-circular-11-june-1783/. 
 2. See 18 U.S. 317 (1820). 
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excepted, was “imperial” insofar as federal policymakers and public officials imposed the 
United States’ sovereignty over people with little choice in the matter—Native Americans, 
especially. To be sure, local and national politicians did not always agree on the means 
and timing of such expansion, and there were moments of fierce domestic politics like 
with the debate over the admission of Texas as a state. Yet there was still a general 
consensus among policymakers, public officials, and the politically active public on the 
desirability of a larger, more populous, and wealthier United States. 
Two recent books revisit and reanalyze this history of conquest and growth, Adam 
Burns’s American Imperialism: The Territorial Expansion of the United States and Paul 
Frymer’s Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion. 
Both books return to the United States’ history of American geographic expansion and 
political development and seek to (re)define the United States as an actor in world history. 
Notwithstanding their similar titles and subtitles, these are very much distinct projects with 
their own contributions to the history and analysis of American empire, and they merit 
separate discussions. The former consists of an extended description of the history of U.S. 
geographic expansion both continental and worldwide from 1783 to 2013.3 The latter 
seeks to explain American empire building as the result of public land policy—federal 
policy that politicians and public officials designed and executed for the purpose of 
promulgating a white-dominated nation-state. Each book prompts its own comments and 
questions.4 
Burns, a historian, defines “empire” as a state’s “explicit and durable assertions of 
political sovereignty.”5 For the United States, these “assertions” included the “subjugation 
of Native Americans,” the “proliferation of U.S. military bases overseas,” and the “still 
unequal relationship with many of its insular possessions.”6 The author includes 
“protectorates, military occupations, and foreign base agreements” in this empire, but he 
excludes “informal imperialism,” “cultural hegemony,” and “economic empire.”7 
Burns uses government documents, the writings and statements of political leaders 
and other public authorities, and extensive secondary sources to trace the 230-year record 
of U.S. expansion from the Treaty of Paris to 2013. This history encompasses well-known 
episodes of expansion, such as the Louisiana Purchase, the 1846 Mexican-American War 
and 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the establishment of an independent Panama, 
separate from Colombia, with the construction of the Panama Canal.8 American 
Imperialism likewise addresses the controversial Spanish-American War and its 
subsequent impact on U.S. relations with Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.9 Burns 
particularly focuses on the United States’ longstanding interests in Cuba, Guantanamo 
Bay, and the Caribbean more generally—interests that were later manifest in the United 
                                                          
 3. See ADAM BURNS, AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(2017). 
 4. See PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL 
EXPANSION (2017). 
 5. BURNS, supra note 3, at 1. 
 6. Id. at 1–2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 12–13, 19–22, 120–27. 
 9. Id. at 76–87, 92–109. 
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States’ 1983 intervention in Grenada and its 1989 invasion of Panama.10 The author also 
discusses the United States’ chronic interests in annexing Hawai’i, given the islands’ 
strategic location as a mid-ocean coaling station and their sugar production.11 
More surprising is American Imperialism’s investigation of less familiar and less 
well-understood episodes of territorial expansion, such as the United States’ attempts to 
annex Canada and the U.S.-British debates over the boundaries of “Oregon.”12 Other less 
studied aspects of American geopolitical expansion are the purchase of Alaska, the United 
States’ and Canada’s settlement of Alaska’s (final) boundaries, and the American Colonial 
Society’s efforts to relocate African Americans to Liberia, which the U.S. Congress 
initially underwrote with $100,000 in funding.13 The book further examines the United 
States’ claims in the 1850s over several guano-laden islands and, later, other islands and 
island groups.14 Of further distinction among studies of American geographic and political 
expansion, the book explores the United States’ postwar occupations of Germany and 
Japan—even if these explorations are consistent with the book’s definition of “empire.”15 
The fact that Burns concludes with a short study of “The Polar Frontier,” which discusses 
the several strategic and economic reasons for the United States’ interests in the Arctic, 
evidences the book’s unconventional qualities.16 
Burns’ focus on the geographical description of American imperialism exacts its 
costs, and he does not describe or analyze the political process(es) by which the United 
States acquired its empire. Neither does he explain how the quality of the American empire 
could change over time and in different regions. Instead, the author takes the unusual step 
of encouraging his readers to reach their own conclusions on the history of U.S. 
imperialism.17 
Even so, buried in the text is Burns answer to the question “why Empire?” Burns’s 
view seems to be: a lot of reasons.18 One was the U.S. government’s “desire to satiate [the] 
land-hungry settlers” of mid-western and far-western North America.19 The Spanish-
American War revealed other reasons for empire: the “duty” and “responsibility” 
American policymakers felt for other, less fortunate peoples; the desire for commercial 
and material gain (also evident with the U.S. annexation of the unpopulated Guano 
Islands); the advancement of U.S. strategic interests, consistent with the United States’ 
later agreement to defend the Trust Territories of the Pacific; and national aggrandizement 
within the global system of states.20 
Yet another driving principle behind American imperialism was “preclusive 
imperialism” (or, “strategic preemption”), as with the annexation of the eastern Samoan 
                                                          
 10. BURNS, supra note 3, at 59–67, 79–80, 92–97, 136–46, 166–69. 
 11. Id. at 70–76. 
 12. Id. at 30–41. 
 13. Id. at 42–47, 50–55. 
 14. Id. at 55–59. 
 15. BURNS, supra note 3, at 146–53. 
 16. Id. at 171–76. 
 17. Id. at 2. 
 18. See JOHN DARWIN, THE EMPIRE PROJECT (2009) (proposing that the British empire itself was the product 
of a mix of three different sorts of empire). 
 19. BURNS, supra note 3, at 26. 
 20. Id. at 78, 87. 
3
Sparrow: Becoming an American Empire
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018
SPARROW-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019  3:27 PM 
342 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:339 
islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Marianas, as well as the post-
WWII occupation of Germany.21 The postwar occupations of Germany and Japan, the 
latter with General MacArthur’s promotion of a democratic Japan centered on the Diet, 
and Iraq (2003-2014) point to nation building as another motive. 
As for the means of American imperialism, the author again gives multiple reasons. 
Imperialism was the product of representative elections and legislative actions, as with the 
United States’ expansion across continental North America. It was also the result of the 
actions by U.S. presidents and their advisers—subject to the approval of Congress—as 
with the purchase of Alaska and annexation of the Northern Marianas. And it was the 
mostly unforeseen consequence of larger developments, as with the annexation of the 
Philippines after the 1898 Treaty of Paris, and the four-power partition of Germany after 
the Second World War. However able to do so, the United States expanded, and kept 
expanding. 
Occasionally, American Imperialism misleads. Although the book discusses the 
atrocities and human suffering that attended imperialism, such as the use of the “water 
cure” (i.e., waterboarding) in the Philippines,22 it overstates the deliberate harm that 
European Americans inflicted on the Indians. Most Native Americans did not die from 
massacres, insufficient resources (e.g., the burning of crops, the slaughter of buffalo herds, 
the loss of hunting grounds and depletion of large game), or from the harsh, forced 
relocations westward and, then, into reservations; they succumbed to infectious 
diseases.Ninety percent of American Indians died from influenza, measles, the black 
plague, tuberculosis, smallpox, syphilis, typhus, whooping cough, and other contagious 
diseases because of their less exposed, more vulnerable immune systems. Conversely, 
though, the book omits the great harm done to Indians by the liquor trade and alcoholism 
and by the multiple consequences of Indian slavery. 
Unfortunately, and particularly because American Imperialism is intended to be a 
primer on U.S. geographic expansion, most of the book’s eleven maps are not well-
executed. Maps with higher resolution, such as “Admission of States and Territorial 
Acquisition” and “Arctic Region” contain explanatory text almost too small to read, and 
maps with more legible text, such as “American Samoa” and “U.S. Virgin Islands,” have 
low-resolution images.23 Moreover, other maps, because of the close gradations in the 
shades of gray that they use, are less helpful.24 
Lastly, Burns’s statement that “the annexations that followed the Spanish-American 
War gave birth to a new type of ambiguous and unequal relationship between the United 
States and its overseas possessions” merits more elaboration, given that the United States’ 
later territorial annexations (with the exception of Hawai’i) “did not lead to future 
states.”25 The author thereby suggests that the Spanish-American War marked an 
inflection point in the history of American imperialism: the transition from an era of 
geographic expansion accompanied by the extension of political membership of the 
                                                          
 21. Id. at 113–18, 131, 146. 
 22. Id. at 106. 
 23. Id. at 21, 117, 128, 172. 
 24. BURNS, supra note 3, at 103, 126. 
 25. Id. at 76. 
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territorial residents, to an era of sovereignty being imposed over peoples who were not to 
be wholly incorporated into the American polity. 
In the first era, the United States added areas which, after being organized as 
territories and achieving a sufficiently large population, were admitted as states. After the 
Spanish-American War, however, the United States kept its new acquisitions as territories: 
Puerto Rico and Guam after 1898; American Samoa after 1899; the U.S. Virgin Islands 
after 1917; and the Northern Mariana Islands after 1976. In this latter period, the United 
States exerted sovereignty without admitting the people of the islands as full citizens. 
Instead, the United States intervened in and occupied foreign countries—Nicaragua, Haiti, 
the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Iraq, and others—and built hundreds of military bases 
worldwide, many of them constructed under U.S. occupation and retained after the 
departure of U.S. forces (e.g., Germany, Japan, Iraq). But whether an empire constitutes 
an extended federal republic, however delayed the admission of new states, or exercises 
sovereignty over people and regions without political representation and guaranteed 
political rights—or with subordinate representation and limited rights—is of some 
consequence.26 
American Imperialism nevertheless provides a helpful and detailed description of 
over two centuries of American imperialism. The fact that the book includes the less 
familiar histories of Vermont, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Marianas, and Trust 
Territories of the Pacific, as well as the better-known histories of westward expansion and 
the Spanish-American War, makes this a useful and informative volume.27 
In contrast to Burns’s overview of the geography of American empire, Paul Frymer, 
a political scientist, poses a single question in his Building an American Empire: how was 
a supposedly weak American state, with a small army and miniscule federal bureaucracy, 
able to settle and control much of the North American continent and thereby create a white 
nation-state? Frymer’s answer, based on extensive readings of U.S. territorial papers, 
presidential and congressional records, court opinions, personal papers, contemporaneous 
newspapers, and secondary sources, is that U.S. government officials—i.e., the agents for 
the American state—were able to do so by essentially controlling the terms and timing of 
western expansion.28 
Frymer challenges the commonly held view that the antebellum American state was 
ineffectual and incapable of regulating westward expansion and settler migration. The 
author does not deny that “capitalist enterprises,” such as the cotton industry and railroads, 
contributed to the presence of racial diversity within a “white hegemonic society,” but his 
purpose is “not to negate these alternative explanations . . . .”29 Neither is it his intention 
to contest the idea of the United States as an expanding Protestant nation, one whose 
people could convert and “civilize[ ]” the Indians, reject Mormons over most of the 
nineteenth century, and reluctantly include Catholics, Quakers, Jews, Muslims, and other 
                                                          
 26. See FREDERICK MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY AND MISSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A REINTERPRETATION 
(1963). 
 27. BURNS, supra note 3, at 11, 16–22, 114–19, 159–65. 
 28. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 29. Id. at 15–16. 
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non-Protestant faiths.30 Rather, Frymer’s goal is to “illuminate the ways in which 
American political development was sharply influenced by a seemingly innocuous but 
transcendent public policy.”31 And here, the state “was frequently critical in determining 
the contours of American expansion.”32 
The author reveals the impact of U.S. land policy by studying the history of empire 
building across an array of regions and time periods so as to highlight the effects of five 
variables: geography, demography, national party control (i.e., which party had control of 
Congress), state capacity, and institutional venue.33 He studies the pre-1840 settlement of 
the cis-Mississippi west, three major aspects of the Louisiana Purchase, and the history of 
European-American expansion into the southwest and the Territory of New Mexico.34 He 
also focuses on the tension between the expansion of white America and the presence of 
free blacks that resulted in efforts to relocate African Americans.35 He further discusses 
the evolution of the United States from predominantly a settler nation to an overseas 
empire.36 
These case histories show how policymakers and public officials used land policy 
to channel and delimit European-American settlement for the purpose of building and 
maintaining a white settler nation. American authorities determined the means and tempo 
of national expansion by deliberately constraining the range of territorial expansion (e.g., 
per the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, whereby the United States declined to 
annex Mexico south of the Rio Grande) and by deferring the annexation of states, whereby 
Congress postponed admitting the territories with large minority populations as states. By 
delaying statehood for Oklahoma (Indian Territory), New Mexico, Arizona, and Hawai’i, 
with their respective Native American, Hispanic, and Polynesian and East Asian 
populations, American policymakers were able to minimize the political influence of non-
whites within the admitted states. “[W]hite racism,” Frymer summarizes, “drove ideas of 
manifest destiny that led the nation to take new lands with little care for those in its path.”37 
The author recognizes that politicians and public officials were not always 
successful. Sometimes fumbling, sometimes mismanaging, and sometimes failing 
outright, state actors were unable to create a solely white republic.38 They only partially 
succeeded in removing Indians.39 They were incapable of relocating more than several 
thousand African Americans to Liberia.40 And large numbers of Hispanics/Latinos, 
Chinese, and other racial minorities became residents of the United States and, eventually, 
citizens. Policymakers and public officials were nonetheless mostly able to guide and 
direct the population growth of the expanding United States, to create a moving buffer 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 154–55, 265. 
 31. Id. at 16. 
 32. Id. at 12. 
 33. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 27–28. 
 34. Id. at 32–127, 128–71, 172–219. 
 35. Id. at 220–62. 
 36. Id. at 27–31. 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 21. 
 39. Id. at 113–23, 124. 
 40. Id. at 228–52. 
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against the American Indian and Mexican populations, to uphold the primacy of the United 
States as a white nation, and to maintain the constitutional order. 
If some of the history of American western (and southern and northern) expansion 
beyond the original thirteen states covers well-trodden ground, such as the Trail of Tears 
and the removal of American Indians from the southeastern United States, Frymer, like 
Burns, brings detailed and welcome focus to less appreciated aspects of American 
expansion. One aspect is the long history and aggregate size of the area—a total of sixty-
one million acres—that colonial, state, and national governments dispersed to military 
veterans as land bounties in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.41 These 
land bounties were intended to compensate underpaid or unpaid veterans, and rank and 
length of service determined the acreage of the bounty. State actors could also use the 
bounties to establish militarized buffer zones between settled areas and Indian-controlled 
lands, thereby directing the timing and location of white expansion into the borderlands.42 
Another unexpected aspect of American expansion is the number of politicians, 
including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Henry Clay, and Thomas Hart Benton, 
who advocated settler colonialism, sometimes to the extent of supporting preemption (that 
is, the acknowledgment of the limited rights inherent in persons such as squatters who 
resided on and improved land they did not own). These politicians wanted and planned for 
the “western country [to be] won from the savages.”43 
In addition, Frymer offers an eye-opening account of the long history of efforts to 
relocate African Americans in the antebellum era. U.S. officials’ and policymakers’ 
solution for blacks on American soil was to remove them from the land. As early as 1782, 
Jefferson proposed the relocation of African Americans in his Notes on the States of 
Virginia (if not specifically back to Africa); other prominent European Americans, many 
of whom were affiliated with the American Colonization Society founded in 1816, agreed 
that the best way to resolve racial differences in the United States was to separate and 
relocate African Americans.44 
The author’s exploration and analysis of these mostly unsuccessful initiatives that 
took place over dozens of years, coupled with his close study of Indian removal and the 
evolution of Oklahoma from Indian Country to statehood, illuminate the central role of 
race in the expansion of the United States as a federation of states.45 With the United 
States’ new, post-1898 Caribbean and Pacific territories and Hawai’i, Frymer shows that 
the tight relationship between race and the American nation continued and remains with 
us today.46 
The maps, figures, and graphs in Building an American Empire are consistently 
helpful in indicating the variations in the timing and location of U.S. territorial expansion 
and empire building. Maps of congressional votes on land issues bring into relief how 
members of Congress voted according to region and racial policy. Votes on the financial 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 57. 
 42. Id. at 57–59. 
 43. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 136. 
 44. Id. at 225–62. 
 45. Id. at 155–67. 
 46. Id. at 268–75. 
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terms of land disposition, such as Preemption in 1838 and the Homestead Act in 1854 were 
characterized by a pronounced east-west split among House members.47 However, votes 
on western land policies that involved race, such as the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska bill, and 
the 1854 Homestead bill to restrict its provisions to whites only, were determined on the 
basis of the North-South divisions among members of Congress.48 
In sum, Building an American Empire presents a comprehensive, thoroughly 
documented, and well-argued account of how American politicians and federal officials 
forged a white nation that was able to incorporate much of continental North America and, 
later, overseas possessions in the decades from 1783 to 1912. Frymer explains how 
political elites carefully regulated the many dimensions of federal land policy in order to 
forge a white nation out of vast, thinly populated, and demographically diverse terrain that 
would eventually become the area of the non-original lower forty-eight states. 
Remarkably for a book of this scope and detail, I noticed only two minor errors. 
More than five states “resulted” from Northwest Territory because the eastern portion of 
Minnesota, east of the Mississippi River, was also part of the old Northwest.49 
Additionally, California was never a “territory” before becoming a state because California 
was a military district ruled by a succession of military and civilian governors for the 
nearly three years between the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in early 1848 and its 
admission as a state in late 1850.50 
It is the author’s larger analytical decisions that elicit reservations. Specifically, the 
book focuses nearly exclusively on land policy; it is selective in its use of evidence; and it 
conceives of the state in a constrained and, arguably, misleading way. 
“Land policies,” Frymer writes, “enabl[ed] the government to overcome the 
weaknesses of a federal state by incentivizing and strategically privatizing an ‘armed 
occupation’ of citizens to settle and secure territory.”51 Although the author briefly 
acknowledges the presence of other, non-land policies, he does not explain how the effects 
of these other federal policies compare with the effects of land policy in facilitating the 
westward emigration of European Americans.52 
One set of policies that crucially contributed to the European-American conquest of 
the trans-Appalachian and trans-Mississippi west was the mandates and operations of the 
Army Corps of Topographical Engineers. The ‘Topogs’ explored, surveyed, mapped, and 
planned the roads, canals, and railway routes over countless miles of the North American 
interior.53 It could well be argued that it was the Topographical Corps that ‘won the west’ 
by preparing the way for white emigration, making possible the extraction and harvesting 
of resources, and laying the foundations for commercial development. 
Another contribution to of empire building was the personnel, installations, and 
                                                          
 47. Id. at 141, 147. 
 48. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 146, 150. 
 49. Id. at 83. 
 50. Id. at 200. 
 51. Id. at 71. 
 52. Id. at 81. 
 53. See WILLIAM H. GOETZMANN, ARMY EXPLORATION IN THE AMERICAN WEST. 1803-1863 (1959). See 
also WILLIAM H. GOETZMANN, EXPLORATION AND EMPIRE: THE EXPLORER AND THE SCIENTIST IN THE 
WINNING OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1966). 
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military campaigns of the U.S. Army. Soldiers provided information to overland travelers. 
They assisted sick and exhausted migrants. They furnished crucial supplies, including guns 
and ammunition. They provided protection against Indian attacks. They succeeded in 
removing the Native American populations, with most Indians relocated to reservations.54 
Indicatively, the Army had eight forts or other installations in the territories in 1800, twelve 
in 1820, twelve in 1830, thirteen in 1845, sixty-nine in 1870, and fifty-seven in 1885.55 
Unsurprisingly, many cities in the non-original states originated as frontier forts, such as 
Fort Washington (Cincinnati), Fort Wayne, Fort Lauderdale, Fort Myers, Fort Smith, Fort 
Worth, Fort Collins, Laramie (Fort Sanders), New Fort Boise (Boise), and others. 
A third important contributor to the creation of a white nation-state was the U.S. 
mail system. The United States had 21,000 miles of post roads in 1800 (inclusive of the 
states and the territories), a figure that doubled to 44,000 by 1815 and rose to 144,000 
miles of post roads by 1845.56 Concomitantly, the number of post offices in the territories 
increased from 10 in 1800 to 177 in 1820 and 346 in 1845. There were 532 post offices in 
the territories in 1870 (exclusive of those in the states) and 2519 post offices by 1885.57  
In comparison, in 1830 France had four post offices per 100,000 residents, Britain had 
seventeen, and the United States had seventy-four.58  These comparisons provide the basis 
for Alexis de Tocqueville’s amazement at finding that “the district of Michigan, . . . still 
virtually untouched wilderness, had developed 940 miles of post roads [and that] [t]he 
almost completely wild territory of Arkansas was already traversed by 1938 miles of post 
roads.”59 By “reach[ing] into the depths of the wilderness . . .” to distribute newspapers, 
periodicals, and other materials, the U.S. mail was able connect the European-American 
residents of the territories and borderlands.60 Not only was the mail the soul of commerce, 
it created “powerful intellectual bonds”61 among settlers and helped to forge their political 
and social identities. 
The author cautions his reader that he is not attempting “to negate [ ] alternative 
explanations . . . .”62 Yet he  cannot both downplay the book’s explanatory ambition and, 
at the same time, make repeated claims of the dominant role of land policy in the building 
a white American empire.63 Without a comparison of U.S. government land policy and 
these other public policies, we cannot know their relative impact. We do not know which 
was in fact dominant, if they simply complemented each other, or to what extent these 
                                                          
 54. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, BROADAX AND BAYONET: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHWEST, 1815-1860 (1953); ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS: THE UNITED 
STATES ARMY AND THE INDIAN 1866-1891 (1973); ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIERSMEN IN BLUE: THE UNITED 
STATES ARMY AND THE INDIAN 1848-1865 (1967). 
 55. See BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, Territorial Government, in 2 THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 820 (Michael Kazin, Rebecca Edwards, & Adam Rothman eds., 2010). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND 
POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001). 
 59. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 444 n.79 (Arthur Goldhammer ed., 2004) (1835). 
 60. Id. at 444. 
 61. Id. 
 62. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 16. 
 63. Id. at 14–16, 277. 
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policies were planned and conducted independent of each other. 
A second issue is the book’s concentrated focus on official sources. The author’s 
arguments rest on the evidence provided by government documents, politicians’ papers, 
and other records. The result is a compellingly sourced historical analysis. At the same 
time, Building an American Empire presents a selective analysis of American empire 
building, one that virtually ignores the voices of the settlers, adventurers, speculators, 
businessmen, squatters, and other whites who emigrated into borderlands. Only 
infrequently does the book refer to the statements of political authorities who opposed the 
dominant positions of the day. 
Frymer recognizes that statements by Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, 
American presidents, and other elites on the desirability of European immigration often 
“did not translate into actual legislation.”64 Yet the book’s many quotations on the topic 
and its discussion of the desirability of immigration suggests that this rhetoric did matter. 
The implication is that the statements by Franklin, Hamilton, and others were significant. 
But the author omits a discussion of the other factors that led to European emigration: the 
‘push’ from the poverty, overcrowding, and unrest in Europe (as with the Irish potato 
famine and the revolutions of 1848), and the ‘pull’ from the advertisements, sales pitches, 
and inflated promises of the agents acting on behalf of both American and European ship 
companies, land companies, railroads, and others who stood to profit from immigration to 
the North American colonies and, later, the United States. 
The favoring of official sources is also manifest in the book’s study of veterans’ land 
bounties. As others have pointed out, relatively few Revolutionary War veterans wanted 
to relocate to unknown and possibly dangerous borderlands, and they sold their scrip to 
speculators—many of whom were former military officers—for pennies on the dollar.65 
The plans for the land bounties to induce armed veterans and their families to populate the 
ever-shifting borderlands before and after the Revolution had uneven results. Depending 
on the granting government and the period in question, some bounty systems worked better 
than others. And while the author acknowledges that some land policies “were never 
implemented with great success,” this caveat does little to counter the general impression 
left by the text.66 
The book similarly takes at face value the statements by politicians on the 
desirability of preemption as a means to buffer areas of European-American settlement 
from Indians and, later, Mexicans. The U.S. government, Frymer writes, “remained 
importantly . . . at the center of public land distribution.”67 But it is by no means clear how 
much control public authorities actually had over the illegal squatting, fraudulent title 
claims, rigged land auctions, and other actions involved with the disposition of public land, 
as Everett Dick, Christian Fritz, Roy Robbins, Malcolm Rohrbaugh, and others find. 
Frymer briefly writes of the widespread fraud and corruption in the settlement of the 
                                                          
 64. Id. at 55–62. 
 65. See DANIEL M. FRIEDENBERG, LIFE LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF LAND: THE PLUNDER OF EARLY 
AMERICA 173–74, 184–85, 278–81 (1992); HARRY S. STOUT, AMERICAN ARISTOCRATS: A FAMILY, A FORTUNE, 
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 25–32, 45–46 (2017). 
 66. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 56. 
 67. Id. at 131. 
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Alabama and Missouri territories,68 and he notes that deregulatory land policies, such as 
preemption and the Homestead Act, led to “increased opportunities for industry, land 
speculators, railroads, as well as the seeming inevitable corruption that follows such bursts 
of entrepreneurialism.”69 He does not contest the causal relationships implicated by 
officials’ statements, however, or address this larger body of scholarship. 
The center of Americans’ conquest of the near west and ever-outward borderlands—
extending south, southwest, west, and northwest—was arguably not so much the U.S. 
government and public land policy; rather, at the center was the great discrepancy between 
the sparsely populated and resource-rich lands of North America and the much denser 
populations in Europe and the older, more eastern portions of the colonies and early states. 
For instance, by 1775 between 25,000 and 30,000 European Americans had already 
crossed the Proclamation Line of 1763.70 Or, to offer another example, before any of the 
land in Iowa was surveyed and officially sold, 15,000 people were already squatting on its 
most desirable lands. 
Congress, moreover, was effectively endorsing what amounted to formally illegal 
behavior when it became increasingly tolerant of preemption and protective of squatters’ 
rights. As Senator Henry Clay told his congressional colleagues in 1838, preemption 
“reward[s] . . . those who, in the first instance, violate the laws.”71 Like the British 
government before it, the U.S. government was incapable, or unwilling to endure the 
political costs, of blocking, much less reversing, white emigration into the less settled 
regions of North America.72 
The near-exclusive focus on policymakers and government officials thereby 
minimizes the role that adventurers, frontiersmen, landless whites, entrepreneurs, and 
others had in emigrating to and residing in the borderlands. While it is very possible that 
the everyday actions of European American were congruent with the desire of public 
authorities to secure a white nation-state, the contributions of ‘whiteness’ call for further 
examination. Americans often emigrated to the borderlands irrespective of government 
policies, given the cheaper land and the better opportunities for hunting, farming, ranching, 
mining, and other ways of making a living and possibly getting rich. And politicians tried 
to put as good a face on this situation as they could. 
The prominent role played by non-governmental actors in the creation of an 
American empire leads to a third issue: the fact that the book’s analysis is premised on a 
‘weak state’ versus ‘strong state’ dichotomy. This conceptualization of empire building, 
where the state is either ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ depending on the issue area and the specific 
circumstances at hand,73 obscures the frequent collaboration and collusion between 
politicians, government officials, and other public authorities, on the one hand, and 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 90–91, 94. 
 69. Id. at 131, 168. 
 70. See EVERETT DICK, THE LURE OF THE LAND: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS FROM THE 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION TO THE NEW DEAL 50 (1970). 
 71. HENRY CLAY, SPEECH ON THE PREEMPTION BILL IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 26, 1838), 
reprinted in 2 THE LIFE AND SPEECHES OF THE HON. HENRY CLAY, IN TWO VOLUMES 304, 307 (Van Amringe 
& Bixby 6th ed., 1844). 
 72. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 128–31. 
 73. Id. at 11–14. 
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commercial enterprises, organized interests, and individual actors, on the other hand. The 
author observes that the state was flexible and that it was sometimes able to coordinate 
and galvanize private interests “on behalf of public goals.”74 What he does not consider is 
the equally plausible scenario that “private power and rising capitalist enterprises” were 
often able to motivate state actors and collaborate with them on behalf of private goals.75 
The intersection of public and private interests is particularly evident in the 
extraordinary expansion of the national railroad system. The railroads flourished not 
because of their independence from public policy and governmental action, but because of 
their close relations with the state and national governments. Congress ceded ninety-one 
million acres to the railroads for their rights of way and land grants, and another thirty-
eight million to the states for railroad purposes, for a total of 129 million acres between 
1850 and 1923. The Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads also borrowed extensively 
from the federal government, fifty-one million dollars and forty-five million dollars, 
respectively.76 In addition, members of Congress often had financial interests in the 
construction of the transcontinental railroad and other rail lines—a reality that would 
become infamous with the 1872-1873 Credit Mobilier scandal. The railroads were 
necessarily involved in the land business, and with the new, jointly produced railways 
came further settlement, new commerce, more resource extraction, and continued Indian 
removal. 
The intermeshing of public and private interests in public policymaking is further 
manifest in the operations of the American Colonization Society (“ACS”). The ACS 
consisted of both non-politicians and political leaders, such as Jefferson, Madison, 
Monroe, Clay, and other leading American politicians and officeholders. It was founded 
by a Presbyterian minister and supported by prominent Quakers, evangelicals, 
abolitionists, and wealthy southern plantation owners. The ACS’s own branch members 
and affiliated churches supplied much of the later financial support for eventual 
transportation of 12,000 African Americans to the colony of Liberia.77 
And sometimes, federal, territorial, and state officials and politicians were 
themselves the investors, speculators, and entrepreneurs. George Washington and other 
presidents, John Marshall and other jurists, members of the Continental Congress and U.S. 
Congress, Land Office personnel, territorial officials, and other public employees often 
simultaneously wore two hats: one of a politician or public official, and another of a 
commercial stakeholder. Public authorities routinely invested in, speculated on, and 
profited from the opening and development of western lands, as Marion Clawson, Everett 
Dick, Lewis Gould, Patricia Nelson Limerick, Roy Robbins, Malcolm Rohrbaugh, and 
others show. 
Frymer occasionally writes of the crossover between public and private interest. He 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 12. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See ROY ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 1776-1970, at 223–25 (2d rev. ed., 
1976). 
 77. American Colonization Society (1816-1964), BLACKPAST.ORG, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/american-
colonization-society-1816-1964 (last visited July 5, 2018). The novelist and abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe 
supported the relocation of slaves to Africa, per her conclusion to Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
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discusses the Ohio Company’s influence on the Northwest Ordinance,78 and he comments 
on the settlers in Texas who “forced the hand of American domestic policy makers.”79 
Despite a brief reference to the work of Paul Wallace Gates,80 however, he does not 
address Gates’s arguments on this point. Neither does he engage in the arguments of other 
historians on how policymakers and government officials often worked closely with, or 
were actual participants in, the commercial enterprises that were a near-constant feature of 
westward expansion, the development of a white nation-state, and empire building. 
There is a large body of scholarship on American political development and state-
building that does acknowledge the indispensable role played by ostensibly non-
governmental actors in the exercise of political authority. Ellis Hawley wrote of the 
“associational” or “associative” state in the 1970s, and Brian Balogh, Margaret Canaday, 
Shelley Hurt and Ronnie Lipshutz, Lawrence Jacobs and Desmond King, Suzanne Mettler, 
and other social scientists and political historians have more recently written of and 
elaborated on the “hybrid state,” the “submerged state,” the “relational state,” the 
“parastate,” and equivalent concepts of the jointness of state-building. These and other 
scholars have studied how policymakers and public officials often cooperate politically 
with the heads of major companies, trade associations, professional organizations, labor 
unions, and other societal actors to achieve certain ends. These objectives may include the 
achievement of particular policy outcomes, allocation of resources, and the establishment 
of political order of mutual benefit to both parties. Had the author adopted one or another 
of these other analytical perspectives on the ‘state,’ he may have arrived at significantly 
different findings with respect to both the processes and content of empire building. 
In short, the signal contributions of other non-land policy instruments in the 
geographic expansion of a race-centered nation-state, the book’s overreliance on official 
statements and public accounts, and the role of public-private cooperation and collusion 
in the building of an American empire raise fundamental questions about Building an 
American Empire. At the same time, however, I would suggest that questions of the 
centrality and dominance of land policy, of the actual independence and efficacy of state 
actors, and of the conceptualization and operationalization of the study the American state 
are the direct converse of the book’s virtues: namely, its tightly-focused scholarship and 
admirable theoretic ambition. 
The end result is that Frymer lays down an important marker. He provides a richly 
documented, extensively detailed, and theory-driven account of the importance of U.S. 
land policy in the development of a white nation-state and American empire. He shows 
how U.S. policymakers and public officials deliberately sought to remove and suppress 
Native Americans, how they acted to minimize the importance of and to relocate African 
Americans, how they wanted to marginalize the influence of the Hispanic populations of 
the southwest, and how they continue to politically discriminate against the non-white 
residents of the United States’ insular possessions. And they largely succeeded, even if it 
took much more than their own efforts to create a white American empire. It ultimately 
took many other policies aside from federal land policy to conquer the continent, and 
                                                          
 78. FRYMER, supra note 4, at 58–59. 
 79. Id. at 175. 
 80. Id. at 152 n.88. 
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required many other organized interests and commercial actors to coordinate and collude 
with public authorities to build a white nation-state. 
The ideal of the United States as a settler nation—white, male, and entrepreneurial—
remains the coin of the realm, and Frymer reveals a large piece of how this came to be. 
Building an American Empire thereby offers a salutary corrective to the emphasis that 
much scholarship in American Political Development—a subfield of American political 
science—places on bureaucracy. It also provides an alternative perspective on race and the 
role it had in U.S. geographic expansion. Furthermore, it brings welcome attention to the 
American Indians and to the historical reality of the removal, relocation, persecution, and 
political suppression of the non-white residents of North America.81 And it illuminates the 
deep roots of the continued political marginalization of African Americans, Hispanics and 
Latinos, Asians, American Indians, and the citizens of the United States’ Caribbean and 
Pacific territories. 
In sum, Paul Frymer’s and Adams Burns’ studies of American empire each make 
noteworthy contributions in a field crowded with books, such as works by Fred Anderson 
and Andrew Cayton, Neil Ferguson, A.G. Hopkins, Robert Kagan, and Walter Nugent. 
The conclusions that questions about the processes and governance of the United States’ 
territories and possessions demand further investigation and analysis, and that theories of 
state-building and imperial expansion call for greater precision, better specification, and 
more investigation should hardly astonish us. 
 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 278. 
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